Reconceiving the Internal and Social Enforcement Effects of Expressive Regulation by Geisinger, Alex
William & Mary Law Review Online
Volume 58 | Issue 1 Article 1
Reconceiving the Internal and Social Enforcement
Effects of Expressive Regulation
Alex Geisinger
Drexel University, alex.c.geisinger@drexel.edu
Copyright c 2016 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline
Repository Citation
Geisinger, Alex (2016) "Reconceiving the Internal and Social Enforcement Effects of Expressive Regulation," William & Mary Law
Review Online: Vol. 58 , Article 1.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline/vol58/iss1/1
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ALEX GEISINGER*
ABSTRACT
As political resistance to traditional forms of regulation has in-
creased, regulators have turned to the social and behavioral sciences
to identify new and better regulatory tools. One of these new tools is
expressive regulation. Expressive regulation harnesses the internal
and social enforcement mechanisms of community norms as a means
of changing individual behavior. Expressive regulation holds
significant promise for influencing many different types of behaviors,
and its low administrative and enforcement costs are particularly
appealing in the current political climate. However, the use of
expressive regulation is hampered by a well-entrenched belief in legal
scholarship that social enforcement of norms is available only in
small, close-knit communities and ineffective in the case of large-
group cooperation problems. 
This Article reconsiders the divide between social and internal
enforcement. It argues that regulatory intervention can overcome the
limitations to social enforcement in large groups, and describes the
way in which such regulation can do so. The insights it generates are
readily adaptable to a wide variety of situations in which large-
group cooperation problems exist.
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INTRODUCTION
Today, stories of the failed regulatory state are ubiquitous in both
politics and legal scholarship.  Regulation is criticized as1
inefficient,  ineffective,  and sometimes paternalistic.  Rulemaking2 3 4
has ossified and, as agency budgets decrease, the ability to enforce
existing regulations becomes more and more limited.  These5
circumstances place significant pressure on agencies to identify new,
efficient ways to regulate that control behavior with minimal ad-
1. See Brett McDonnell, Don't Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During and After
a Financial Crisis, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011); Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Law
After the Counter-Reformation: Restoring Faith in Pragmatic Government, 48 U. KAN. L. REV.
689, 748-49 (2000); Karly Zande, Raising a Stink: Why Michigan CAFO Regulations Fail to
Protect the State’s Air and Great Lakes and Are in Need of Revision, 16 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1,
4 (2009).
2. See Robert P. Barlett III & Justin McCrary, Trying to Force the S.E.C.’s Hand on
High-Speed Trading, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/19/ busi-
ness /dea lbook / t ry ing- t o - f o rce - the - secs -hand-on-high-speed - t rad ing .html
[https://perma.cc/KJZ5-U2XN]; Mike Konczal, Making Government Simpler Is Complicated,
WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/10/26/ mak-
ing-government-simpler-is-complicated/ [https://perma.cc/TAU8-VPQR]; Brendan Sasso, The
Legal War Over Net Neutrality Has Begun, ATLANTIC (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.the atlantic.
com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-legal-war-over-net-neutrality-has-begun/456501/ [https://
perma. cc/R5JA-D6EQ].
3. See Jennifer Fujawa, The FCC’s Sponsorship Identification Rules: Ineffective
Regulation of Embedded Advertising in Today’s Media Marketplace, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 549,
572-73 (2012); Donald M. Marcus & Arthur P. Grollman, The Consequences of Ineffective
Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 172 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1035, 1036 (2012); Tyler
Cowen, Too Few Regulations? No, Just Ineffective Ones, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2008), http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/09/14/business/14view.html [https://perma.cc/KM9V-4SZ5].
4. See Mark Joseph Stern, Laws to Protect Women Often Do Just the Opposite, SLATE
(Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2016/02/laws_to_protect_
women_often_do_just_the_opposite.html [https://perma.cc/M6CD-REDL]; Andrew Westney,
Tribal Leader Slams CFPB Over Payday Lending Proposal, LAW360 (Feb. 11, 2016), http://
www.law360.com/articles/758474/tribal-leader-slams-cfpb-over-payday-lending-proposal
[https://perma.cc/4GA8-TU22].
5. See Frank Pasquale, The Sharing Economy Doesn't Need to Be Full of Monopolies,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/10/the-sharing-
economy-doesnt-need-to-be-full-of-monopolies/412876/ [https://perma.cc/BC69-SLGC]; Jim
Tozzi, Regulatory Deossification Revisited, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Jan. 25,
2016), http://www.yalejreg.com/blog/regulatory-deossification-revisited-by-jim-tozzi [https://
perma.cc/QNL5-26ZL].
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ministrative cost. Thus, the demand for new and better regulatory
forms has never been greater.
In response, many nations have turned to behavioral theory as a
means of rethinking regulation. Almost all of Europe and the United
States now have behavioral regulation units dedicated to identifying
new ways to regulate behavior efficiently.  Many of these new offices6
have been dubbed “nudge” offices;  however, the insights into regu-7
lation provided by the social and behavioral sciences go well beyond
the “nudge” construct. Thaler and Sunstein first developed the
concept of nudging in their eponymous book, Nudge.  Nudges are8
regulations that change an individual’s choice architecture but do
not mandate any particular behavior as would traditional command
and control mechanisms.  Arguably, nudges are more politically9
6. Behavioural Economics, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/
gov/regulatory-policy/behavioural-economics.htm [https://perma.cc/5L8H-WZBG] (“The use
of behavioural economics by governments and regulators is a growing trend globally, most
notably in the United Kingdom and United States but more recently in Australia, Canada,
Columbia, Denmark, Germany, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, South
Africa, Turkey and the European Union.”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Ethics of Nudging,
32 YALE J. ON REG. 413, 414 & n.3 (2015) (“The last decade has seen a remarkably rapid
growth of interest in choice-preserving, low-cost regulatory tools.”).
7. Alberto Alemanno, Nudge: Hype or Genuine Revolution in Policymaking?, ALBERTO
ALEMANNO BLOG (Sept. 6, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://albertoalemanno.eu/ articles/nudgehype
[https://perma.cc/RZ9V-3P4F] (discussing the launch of TEN—The European Nudge Network);
Donald Marron, Obama's Nudge Brigade: White House Embraces Behavioral Sciences to Im-
prove Government, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2015, 3:32 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/
2015/09/16/obama-nudge-government/#79e0168211f3 [https://perma.cc/G82P-EHJP]
(discussing President Obama’s “Nudge Brigade” and the U.S. effort to use behavioral science
to better regulate); Nudge Nudge, Think Think, ECONOMIST (Oct. 18, 2014), http://www.
economist.com/news/britain/21625871-behavioural-economics-changing-regulation-payday-
lending-target-nudge-nudge-think-think [https://perma.cc/P35A-HV38] (discussing U.K.
behavioral regulation unit known “affectionately as the ‘nudge unit’”).
8. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 6-8 (Yale Univ. Press 2008). For
recent scholarship on nudging see, for example, Ryan Calo, Code, Nudge, or Notice?, 99 IOWA
L. REV. 773, 775 (2014); Brian Galle, Tax, Command . . . or Nudge?: Evaluating the New
Regulation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 837, 839 (2014); Jacob Goldin, Which Way to Nudge? Uncovering
Preferences in the Behavioral Age, 125 YALE L.J. 226, 228-29, 235-36 (2015) (discussing
NUDGE, supra); Aneil Kovvali, Who Are You Calling Irrational?, 110 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE
33, 33 (2015); Cass R. Sunstein, Nudges vs. Shoves, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 210, 210 (2014);
Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155, 1157 (2013).
9. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 6. According to Nudge, “[c]hoice architecture,
both good and bad, is pervasive and unavoidable.” Id. at 252; see also On Amir & Orly Lobel,
Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L.
4
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acceptable because they preserve individual choice.  Choice is10
preserved because individuals can still choose to act on their own
preferences.  A common example is changing the rules for employee11
savings plans so that employees must opt out of saving rather than
opt into saving.  The simple shift maintains the choice not to save,12
but by changing the default from not saving to saving, the shift is
likely to greatly increase the number of people who use a savings
plan.  Given the resistance to individual regulation,  it is no13 14
surprise that regulators have begun to consider these types of
alternative regulatory tools. 
One of the main forms of this new behavioral regulation is based
in activating social norms. Expressive (or “normative”) regulation
changes community norms, or informs the community of existing
norms, and capitalizes on social or internal enforcement of the norm
as the means for changing behavior.  Of course, choice is maintain-15
ed because one can choose not to follow the group norm. Consider,
for example, how smoking laws changed the social meaning of
smoking from something cool to something dirty and unhealthy.16
This change in social meaning led to social ostracism of smokers,
REV. 2098, 2128 (2008). For example, Thaler and Sunstein explain that even if the State gets
out of the business of licensing marriages and civil unions, contract law would still be needed
to define what partners owe each other during and after the relationship. THALER &
SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 237. In this sense, their understanding recalls earlier legal realists
and critical legal thinkers who understood law as constituting the background rules of all
human relationships. See Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal
Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 941 (2007) (describing the
critical insight that law exists in every sphere of life, even those spheres that are seemingly
unregulated).
10. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 5-6.
11. See id.
12. See, e.g., id. at 11-13, 104-110.
13. See id.
14. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
15. For an introduction to the concepts of expressive and normative regulation, see infra
Section II.A. See also RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW 233-39
(Harvard Univ. Press 2015).
16. See Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler, Law, Moral Attitudes, and Behavioral Change,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 241, 248-53 (Eyal Zamir
& Doron Teichman eds., 2014).
5
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and also led some smokers to change their beliefs about smoking.17
This belief change, in turn, resulted in internal sanction, causing
those smokers to feel guilt when they smoked in the future, for
example.  In addition to being less politically objectionable, expres-18
sive regulation is attractive for a variety of other reasons. Norma-
tive campaigns are cheap to create, and enforcement, which
happens primarily through social observation and sanctioning,
carries no administrative costs.  19
A burgeoning legal and social science literature has developed
around the notion of social norms and expressive law.  Virtually20
this entire literature suggests that social enforcement of norms is
not effective to solve large-group cooperation problems.  Indeed,21
foundational works, such as Nobel Laureate Eleanor Ostrom’s Gov-
erning the Commons, suggest that normative influence works best
when individuals regularly interact and rely on one another—a phe-
nomenon most likely to exist in small, rather than large, groups.22
This notion is perhaps best captured by Robert Ellickson in Order
Without Law, in which he describes norms as functioning efficiently
in small, “close-knit groups.”  This distinction between small, close-23
knit groups and large, loose-knit groups is now ubiquitous in the
literature, and is generally taken for granted.  24
Of course, a large number of issues from taxpaying to energy
conservation require the cooperation of large groups of people.25
Existing legal scholarship casts great doubt on the effectiveness of
expressive regulation in such cases. A small number of scholars
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See infra Section II.B.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITU-
TIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
23. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 167-
83 (Harvard Univ. Press 1991).
24. See infra Part II.
25. Courtney Subramanian, ‘Nudge’ Back in Fashion at White House, TIME (Aug. 9, 2013),
http://swampland.time.com/2013/08/09/nudge-back-in-fashion-at-white-house/ [https://perma.
cc/T8UF-EPRN].
6
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have advocated for the use of expressive regulation to solve such
problems. These authors often recognize that social and internal en-
forcement are complementary phenomena, but rely almost entirely
on internal enforcement as the mechanism of action in their analy-
ses.  Thus, large-group games are generally considered to be26
unamenable to effective expressive regulation when strong internal
enforcement is not available.
This Article seeks to reconsider the current thinking regarding
the limits of the social force in large-group games. The Article
asserts that regulation can overcome traditional limits to social
sanctioning by decreasing the transaction costs of norm enforcement
and by using large-scale information reporting to trigger social
enforcement in smaller, close-knit groups. Thus, properly designed,
expressive regulation actually can be a more effective means for
responding to large-group problems. Of course, like any regulatory
tool, expressive regulation comes with pros and cons. In particular,
the fact that norms may have different effects on different groups
has potential implications for regulatory design. After developing its
model of social enforcement in large-group games, the Article will
consider ways in which the potentially negative consequences of
uneven effects can be controlled.
The Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, the Article will provide
a general overview of norm formation and describe the distinction
between social and internal enforcement. In Part II, it will describe
the social and internal enforcement mechanisms in detail and
explain the general theory that paints social sanctioning as effective
only in small, close-knit groups. In Part III, the Article describes the
limitations of internal enforcement and provides a detailed explana-
tion of how powerful social sanctioning forces can be recruited to
26. See, e.g., Stephen M. Johnson, Is Religion the Environment's Last Best Hope?
Targeting Change in Individual Behavior Through Personal Norm Activation, 24 J. ENVTL.
L. & LITIG. 119, 136-38 (2009); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups
to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 359, 364-67 (2003); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order
Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Activation Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW.
U. L.  REV. 1101, 1114 (2005) [hereinafter Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms]; Michael
P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1673, 1706-07 (2007) [hereinafter Vandenbergh & Steinemann, Carbon-Neutral].
7
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solve large-group cooperation problems. Part IV will then consider
the implications of using the social sanctioning model in large-group
games before the Article concludes.
I. SEPARATING THE SOCIAL AND INTERNAL ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS
To better understand the viability and limitations of norm-based
regulation it is necessary to disentangle the effects of social enforce-
ment from internalization. By identifying the ways in which both of
these forces actually change behavior, one can glean insights into
normative regulatory schemes. This Part will describe the internal
and social enforcement mechanisms, starting with a brief introduc-
tion to the concept of norms and the ways in which norms have been
studied in the legal literature to date. It then turns to a basic
account of the game-theoretic model of norms that dominates legal
scholarship. After establishing this groundwork, this Part will turn
to a discussion of the differences between social and internal en-
forcement, and the role played by small and large groups in norm
enforcement.
A. A Brief Introduction to Norms
A large number of law and economics scholars have become dis-
satisfied with the traditional behavioral model.  The vast majority27
27. See generally Russell Korobkin, What Comes After Victory for Behavioral Law and
Economics?, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1653 (2011) (describing how behavioral law and economics
has emerged as the dominant theory of the last decade). There is a long history of legal
scholarship critical of the rational actor model. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory,
Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 673, 678-85
(1979); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 387, 387-89 (1981); Arthur Allen Leff, Commentary, Economic Analysis of Law: Some
Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 451-53 (1974). However, for those scholars
sympathetic to the law and economics tradition, such questioning is of more recent vintage.
See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
537, 537-38 (1998); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Ap-
proach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473-76 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin &
Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from
Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1053-59 (2000).
8
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of scholars have challenged the model's rationality assumption,28
whereas other critics argue that the model is ignorant of the social-
ization process and the human desire for status, as well as the
process by which law may affect preferences for certain behaviors
over others.  This latter group is particularly interested in the abil-29
ity of social norms to control or affect behavior, and the ability of
law to affect social norms and preferences.30
The concept of a “norm” is subject to a variety of definitions.  For31
purposes of this Article, it is enough to define a norm as a behavior-
al rule supported by a pattern of informal sanctions.  The sanctions32
28. See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); Ellickson, supra note
27, at 551-52; Jolls et al., supra note 27, at 1473-76 (describing and applying, among other
things, a concept of bounded rationality); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 27, at 1055-59 (describ-
ing and critiquing the different versions of rational choice theory).
29. See, e.g., GEOFFREY BRENNAN & PHILIP PETTIT, THE ECONOMY OF ESTEEM, at vii (2004);
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Happiness and Punishment,
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1037-39 (2009); John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan
S. Masur, Welfare as Happiness, 98 GEO. L.J. 1583, 1585-88 (2010); John Bronsteen,
Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis,
62 DUKE L.J. 1603, 1605-10 (2013); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the
Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 1-3 (arguing that criminal
law can be better understood in terms of preference shaping than opportunity shaping);
Ellickson, supra note 27, 538-46 (identifying a number of lacunae in classical law and econ-
omics and arguing that these lacunae are major); Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New Legal
Realism,68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 287-88 (2001) (reviewing BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
(Cass Sunstein ed., 2000)).
30. The literature is voluminous. A Westlaw search of the term “social norms” returns
over 10,000 documents. Some examples of recent works that consider social norms in law
include: Rachel Brewster, Pricing Compliance: When Formal Remedies Displace Reputational
Sanctions, 54 HARV. INT'L L.J. 259 (2013) (international environmental law); Stefan Larsson,
Karl Renner and (Intellectual) Property—How Cognitive Theory Can Enrich a Sociolegal
Analysis of Contemporary Copyright, 48 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 3 (2014) (intellectual property);
Sarah B. Lawsky, How Tax Models Work, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1657 (2012) (tax law); Michael L.
Rich, Should We Make Crime Impossible?, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 795 (2013) (criminal
law); Tom R. Tyler, Reducing Corporate Criminality: The Role of Values, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
267 (2014) (corporate law). The seminal work on law and norms is undoubtedly ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
31. Robert Ellickson, for example, defines a norm as a rule supported by a pattern of
informal sanctions. See Ellickson, supra note 27, at 549 n.58. Similarly, Eric Posner defines
a norm as a rule of behavior enforced by private third parties. See Eric A. Posner, Law, Econ-
omics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (1996). Robert Cooter, on the
other hand, defines a norm in the traditional philosophical sense as an obligation. See Robert
Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947, 954 (1997).
32. See Ellickson, supra note 27, at 549 n.58.
9
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can be based on shame, some other type of social ostracism, or guilt.
Thus, a rule against smoking in public places can affect behavior not
just through the civil penalty that accompanies it—that is, its sanc-
tion—but also by increasing the willingness of individuals to shame
or otherwise socially ostracize those who violate its prohibition.33
Moreover, to the extent that such a rule results in the “internaliza-
tion” of the prohibition, individuals will be deterred from such
activity because of the prospect of guilt, regardless of the possibility
of sanction.  The effect of norms on behavior has been considered34
in a wide variety of contexts.35
Expressive regulation, in turn, focuses on utilizing the social and
internal sanctioning process to change behavior. Such regulation
can be either direct or indirect. Most scholarship to date has consid-
ered indirect normative effects of law, and has focused on the way
in which passage of laws affects the “social meaning” of regulated
behavior.  Scholars have, for example, discussed how antismoking36
laws have changed the social meaning of smoking from cool to dirty,
33. Bilz & Nadler, supra note 16, at 250-51.
34. Vandenbergh & Steinemann, Carbon-Neutral, supra note 26, at 1706-07; see also
Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV.
1603, 1603-04 (2000).
35. Eric Posner identifies a number of these applications and adds to the list by consid-
ering how norms influence tax compliance. See Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The
Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1781 & n.2 (2000).
36. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 949-62
(1995) [hereinafter Lessig, Regulation]; Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of
Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1650-51 (2000) (“The thesis is that law influences be-
havior independent of the sanctions it threatens to impose, that law works by what it says in
addition to what it does.”); see, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 661, 680 (1998) (noting that expressive law scholars recognize that the expressive func-
tion of law works not through something physical but through a function that is interpretive).
For example, Lessig argues that a law prohibiting duelers from holding public office worked
better than a law that simply outlawed dueling because it obfuscated the objective meaning
of choosing not to duel. Lessig, Regulation, supra, at 971-72. Under the new law, dueling was
no longer simply a breach of honor that could not be constrained by mere punishment; rather,
it was a choice to maintain honor by undertaking one's duty to do civic work. See id. Similarly,
Cass Sunstein suggests that laws against public smoking may have significantly decreased
the amount of young black Americans who smoke by changing the social meaning of smoking
from attractive rebelliousness to dirtiness and a “willingness to be duped.” Cass R. Sunstein,
On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2034 (1996).
10
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resulting in a change in the social feedback smokers receive.37
Numerous scholars have catalogued a variety of laws and their in-
fluence on the social meaning of behavior.  38
Direct expressive regulation has been much less studied by legal
scholars.  Direct regulation is specifically directed toward acti-39
vating norms in order to change behaviors. In some cases, public
information campaigns attempt to redefine the social meaning of
behavior. Campaigns, such as “Don’t Mess with Texas”  and the40
iconic “Iron Eyes Cody”—also known by its tag line, “People Start
Pollution, People Can Stop It” —embody this idea. Other efforts are41
even more direct and even more clearly focused on social norms as
the mechanism by which behavior is affected. These efforts work
primarily by telling the population what others in the community
37. Sunstein, supra note 36, at 2034. 
38. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender
Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 407-14 (2009) (discussing the expressive role of law in
gender harassment in the workplace and on the internet); Dan M. Kahn, What Do Alternative
Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 597-601 (1996) (discussing the expressive theory and
its role in explaining the relative seriousness of various crimes); Lessig, Regulation, supra
note 36, at 962-91 (discussing a myriad of instances in which social meaning has changed with
social norms); Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law’s Expressive Func-
tion, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039, 1043, 1056-58 (1999) (arguing that courts perform expressive
functions when social capital is high, and establishing two sources of social capital: “norms
of generalized reciprocity” and “networks of civic engagement”); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights
Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 725, 725-26 (1998) (arguing that social norms give content to constitutional rights);
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 471-77
(1997) (analyzing criminal law’s ability to create shared norms and its power as a moral
authority); Sunstein, supra note 36, at 2033-36 (focusing on norms and dangerous behavior).
39. See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, Carbon-Neutral, supra note 26, at 1676-79 (suggest-
ing that policymakers utilize the often overlooked strategy of direct expressive regulation to
alter individual carbon emissions).
40. Ad Archive: Explore Thirty Years, DON’T MESS WITH TEXAS, http://www.dontmesswith
texas.org/the-campaign/ad-archive/ [https://perma.cc/SM2V-RMPQ] (archiving thirty years’
of Texas advertisements aimed at preventing pollution).
41. The Iron Eyes Cody spot begins with a shot of a stately, buckskin-clad Native Amer-
ican chief paddling his canoe up a river that carries various forms of industrial and individual
pollution. Vladas Griskevicius et al., Social Norms: An Underestimated and Underemployed
Lever for Managing Climate Change, 3 INT’L J. SUSTAINABILITY COMM. 5, 6 (2008), http://www.
climateaccess.org/sites/default/files/Cialdini_Social%20Norms.pdf [https://perma.cc/GEP6-
E4DF]. After coming ashore near the littered side of a highway, Iron Eyes Cody watches as
a bag of garbage is thrown from the window of a passing car. Id. From the refuse to his feet,
the camera pans up slowly to his face, where a tear is shown rolling down his cheek. Id. 
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do, directly carrying information on norms to the intended audi-
ence.  For example, a company called “Opower” has successfully42
teamed with utilities in an effort to decrease energy consumption
through the use of mailers that compare one homeowner’s energy
use to that of her neighbors.  Although some mechanisms, such as43
the one used by Opower, have been used to successfully activate
norms, the best means for doing so has yet to be developed.44
B. Norm Formation
A particular vision of norms based in economics and, in particu-
lar, game theory dominates the legal scholarship on social norms.
Foundational norms scholarship has been particularly intrigued by
the effectiveness of normative enforcement in small, close-knit com-
munities. Elinor Ostrom’s analysis of how small communities can
efficiently manage common resources, Robert Ellickson’s study of
how ranchers in Shasta County California opt out of formal law and
choose to follow a set of self-imposed behavioral rules, the informal
controls used by the lobster gangs of Maine, and Lisa Bernstein’s
studies of behavior in the diamond industry, all suggest that norms
function efficiently to control behavior in small groups of individuals
who interact regularly toward the achievement of a common goal.45
Social enforcement in large, loose-knit groups, on the other hand, is
generally considered to be ineffective.
These conclusions are derived from a particular vision of norm
formation. Many scholars  conceive of norms as arising from46
42. See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, Carbon-Neutral, supra note 26, at 1704-09. 
43. Stephen Lacey, Opower Expands Behavioral Demand Response to 1 Million Customers,
GREENTECH MEDIA (May 20, 2014), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/opower-
looks-to-bring-behavioral-demand-response-nationwide [https://perma.cc/HR8E-PDKS].
44. See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, Carbon-Neutral, supra note 26, at 1703-04 (referring
to skepticism about efforts to directly affect behavior on the grounds that research suggests
that information campaigns are ineffective).
45. See infra Section III.A.
46. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic
Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 625-26 (2001) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL
NORMS (2000)) (identifying two groups, those who think of norms in terms of rational choice
and those who do not, and recognizing that economists tend to fall into the former camp). 
12
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cooperation problems that confront rational individuals acting in
their own self-interest.  The prisoner's dilemma is often the start-47
ing point for this analysis.  The prisoner's dilemma posits two48
rational, self-interested individuals who must choose between alter-
nate strategies.  Under the circumstances of the game, rational49
decisions lead to inefficient outcomes.50
Take, for example, the following scenario between players Row
and Column, who are being questioned in separate cells at the police
station.  If one player tells on the other player, the other player will51
get a sentence of three years, whereas the tattler will be let off for
cooperation.  If neither tells they will both be found guilty of a52
lesser offense (one year in jail each).  If both tell, they will both be53
convicted of a more significant offense (two years each).54
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 2/2 0/3
Defect 3/0 1/1
Under these circumstances, Row will always tell. Assume first
that Column will tell. If Row does not tell he will get three years in
47. See infra Part II (discussing foundational work on norms and its reliance on game
theory); see also Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics Movement,
84 GEO. L.J. 2071, 2126 n.235 (1996); Steven Hetcher, Creating Safe Social Norms in a Dan-
gerous World, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1999); Steven A. Hetcher, Norm Proselytizers Create
a Privacy Entitlement in Cyberspace, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 902-03 (2001); Eric A.
Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765,
797 n.52 (1998); Elmer J. Schaefer, Predicting Defection, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 443, 462 (2002).
48. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 13-18 (2000).
49. Id. at 13-15.
50. Id. at 14.
51. Id. at 13-14 (illustrating this example).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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jail, but if he does tell, he will only get a two-year sentence. If
Column does not tell, Row will get no time in jail if he does tell and
one year in jail if he does not tell. Under these circumstances, it is
better for the self-interested Row to tell no matter what Column
does. The dominant strategy for both players will thus be to tell. As
a result, both will receive two years in prison, whereas if they had
stayed silent, they would each only get one year in jail. Pursuit of
individual self-interest leads to worse results than if they had
cooperated and both withheld information.
Whereas defection is the dominant strategy in a one-time play of
the prisoner's dilemma, cooperation is a natural result of such a
problem in situations in which the parties will play the game a
substantial number of times (an iterated game).  Assume, for55
example, that Column and Row are a wholesaler and retailer of
goods. They desire to create a relationship in which Column will
supply the goods at a certain cost. If Column delivers the quality of
goods agreed upon, both parties will make two dollars. If Column
cheats and sends goods of lesser quality, he will make three dollars
and Row will make zero dollars, but Row will defect and Column
will have to look for other cooperative partners. A similar result
would occur if Row cheats by, for example, challenging the quality
of the goods and withholding full payment. Assuming a desire to
play for a number of times, it is better for the parties to cooperate
than defect because making two dollars regularly is better than
making three dollars a few times but developing a reputation for
being untrustworthy, and thus losing cooperative opportunities in
the future.  As Eric Posner says, “logic shows that the optimal move56
is always to cooperate.”57
Social norms within this framework are simply artifacts of the
cooperation between rationally self-interested group members. Put
simply, when the game is played many times between the same
55. Id. at 15-18.
56. Id. at 16.
57. Id. Posner also suggests that the logic of cooperation extends to games involving more
than two players by assuming that everyone has sufficient information about other people’s
past activities. Id. Thus, defection from one pairwise transaction will not lead to a clean slate
in the next pairwise transaction. See id.
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group members, particular norms that reflect the preferences of the
majority of group members will develop. Prisoners will likely devel-
op a preference for not “snitching,”  whereas retailers will prefer58
“good faith and fair dealing.”  Norms are thus a reflection of the59
aggregate preferences of the individuals that comprise the group
when the group members regularly cooperate.
Normative pressure, in turn, is based on the mutual attraction
that arises between people who are interdependent. The attraction
is rooted in “the operation of a need satisfaction or ‘reinforcement’
principle: mutual liking between group members reflects the extent
to which positive, gratifying, or rewarding outcomes are associated
directly or indirectly with being in a cooperative relationship with
each other.”  Economists often model this as a preference for es-60
teem from other group members.  Normative pressure is thus an61
external force that affects individual behavior only to the extent one
is concerned about others to whom he is attracted. Put simply, if an
individual wants to do something he perceives is not condoned by
other group members, and a sense of mutual liking or attraction
exists between the individual and the other group members, then
the individual risks disapproval from others whom he likes when
they observe his behavior.
C. Distinguishing Between Internal and Social Enforcement
Although many energy-conserving behaviors, such as the type of
car one drives, are open to social observation, others, such as how
high one sets his thermostat, are less open to inspection. Norms are
likely to influence behavior differently in each of these two scenar-
ios. The social enforcement model of norms is well developed in legal
58. For a discussion of the anti-snitching norm, see Bret Asbury, Anti-Snitching Norms
and Community Loyalty, 89 OR. L. REV. 1257 (2011).
59. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for
Immanent Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1776 & n.38 (1996).
60. Alex Geisinger & Michael Ashley Stein, A Theory of Expressive International Law, 60
VAND. L. REV. 77, 93 (2007).
61. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 27, at 540-41; Jed S. Ela, Comment, Law and Norms
in Collective Action: Maximizing Social Influence to Minimize Carbon Emissions, 27 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 93, 118-19 (2009). 
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scholarship. As just discussed, social enforcement is rooted in the
“liking” that develops between individuals engaged in mutually ben-
eficial activities, often described as a desire for esteem from other
group members.  When an individual desires esteem from others in62
the group, he attempts to determine the preferences of others and
to act in accordance with them. Conversely, failure to act in
accordance with group norms, when discovered by group members,
will result in social sanctioning.
Internalized enforcement of norms occurs when, instead of con-
cern for esteem, an individual feels guilt for failure to act in
accordance with a norm she believes to be right. As will be discussed
shortly, the mechanism of internal norm change has not been as
well developed in the legal literature.  Scholars, however, have con-63
sidered the use of internal enforcement mechanisms in a number of
instances.  A simple example will demonstrate the differences be-64
tween the two mechanisms. Consider the normative sanctions that
would accompany a parent’s decision not to use a car seat for her
child. If the parent does not use a car seat and neighbors observe
her doing so, she may feel that her neighbors will sanction her
socially by withholding esteem. On the other hand, even if neighbors
are not around, she may feel guilty not using a car seat because she
believes it is the wrong thing to do. 
II. SOCIAL AND INTERNAL ENFORCEMENT MODELS
A. The Social Enforcement Mechanism
An important distinction in the social norm enforcement model
exists between large and small groups. Small groups are generally
considered capable of establishing and enforcing efficient normative
behavioral controls, whereas large groups are generally conceived
of as unable to use norms effectively. This is of particular concern
62. For a general discussion, see Alex Geisinger & Michael Ashley Stein, Rational Choice,
Reputation, and Human Rights Treaties, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1138-39 (2008) (reviewing
ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2007)).
63. See infra Part II.
64. See infra Section II.B.
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because a large number of regulatory targets from taxpaying to
recycling require cooperation among large numbers of individuals.
This Section will describe how small- and large-group distinctions
arise in norms scholarship.
Any study of large versus small groups and formation of social
norms must begin with the influential work of Elinor Ostrom.
Ostrom dedicated a good portion of her Nobel Prize-winning career
to analyzing how groups of individuals can solve commons problems
without legal intervention.  Ostrom’s work specifically engages65
Mancur Olson and others who assume that the collective action
problem created by common ownership cannot be solved without
outside intervention.  Ostrom found that norms do arise spontane-66
ously to solve cooperation problems under certain conditions.67
Among the conditions she identified for norms to spontaneously
arise are small group size and similarities of interests among group
members.  As these conditions suggest, normative solutions to coop-68
eration problems can only arise in small groups whose members
share a compelling mutual need to benefit from the proper manage-
ment of a common resource. These findings, of course, raise signif-
icant concerns regarding the ability of norms to function efficiently
in large, heterogeneous groups.69
Another source of skepticism regarding the effectiveness of social
65. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 22, at 1-2, 25-28.
66. See id. at 1-5 (describing the tragedy of the commons, the prisoner’s dilemma game,
and the logic of collective action); see also Posner, supra note 35, at 1815 (discussing the need
for traditional regulation to solve collective action problems).
67. See OSTROM, supra note 22, at 187-88.
68. See id. at 188.
69. See Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms, supra note 26, at 1112 (noting a
profoundly pessimistic conclusion lies at the core of recent environmental scholarship regard-
ing behavior change in these negative-payoff, loose-knit group situations). When the desired
behavior requires sustained or substantial effort, studies of responses to recycling norm
campaigns suggest that they have limited effects unless they are of the expensive, face-to-face
variety, or the government invests in financial incentives or the infrastructure necessary to
make the behavior convenient. Id. Studies of product labeling have reached similar
conclusions. See id.; see also OSTROM, supra note 22, at 189 (questioning the policy implica-
tions that arise from knowing that the group size increases the difficulty of organizing
collective action, and asking whether it should be assumed that small groups will take care
of themselves while external authorities will manage larger groups).
17
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enforcement of norms in large groups is Robert Ellickson’s influen-
tial study on normative control of behavior among ranchers in
Shasta County, California.  In Order Without Law, Ellickson de-70
scribes how normative controls led ranchers to use their pasture-
land efficiently, avoiding the traditional problem of the commons.71
Ellickson’s seminal study, similar to Ostrom’s, suggests that self-
governing norms may arise in what he describes as small, close-knit
communities.  The influence of Ellickson and Ostrom on legal72
norms scholarship cannot be overstated. In particular, the legal
literature has almost universally adopted the thesis that efficient
norms will develop in small, close-knit groups and has relied on that
concept as a structural component of thinking about norms.73
Of course, both Ostrom’s and Ellickson’s work provide only one
part of the story of norm compliance. In particular, neither author’s
study specifically considers the way in which regulatory interven-
tions into groups could influence normative pressure and change the
behavior of group members.  Their work, instead, focuses on the74
“spontaneous” development of stable normative regimes among
small groups of individuals who share a common resource absent
government intervention.  Direct regulation of norms in large75
groups, however, has been studied in the legal literature. Perhaps
the most influential early article in this regard is Ann Carlson’s
70. ELLICKSON, supra note 23, at 1.
71. Id. at 141.
72. Id. at 167.
73. A Westlaw search of “Ellickson, Order Without Law” returns over 1400 secondary-
source citations in total and over 600 citations in the last decade. A similar search of “Elinor
Ostrom and close-knit” returns nearly 200 citations from the legal literature. For samples of
articles reliant on the vision of small, close-knit groups, see Dotan Oliar & Christopher
Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms
and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1794 (2008); Pammela
Quinn Saunders, A Sea Change off the Coast of Maine: Common Pool Resources as Cultural
Property, 60 EMORY L.J. 1323, 1329-30 (2011); and Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Coase: Emerg-
ing Technologies and Property Theory, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2189, 2213-14 (2012).
74. Ostrom’s work focused primarily on the development of normative communities, and
not on the use of regulation to spur norm compliance; however, she did provide some insight
into the way in which normative communities must be designed to succeed. See OSTROM,
supra note 22, at 88-102 (discussing the topic in-depth).
75. See ELLICKSON, supra note 23, at 4; OSTROM, supra note 22, at 30-33.
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watershed study of programs directed at increasing recycling.  76
Like Ostrom and Ellickson, Carlson starts with the basic collec-
tive action problem of recycling.  In the case of recycling, however,77
the problem is not one that extends to a small number of closely in-
terconnected group members.  Rather, it is one of large groups that78
need to act collectively for mutual benefit.  Carlson places recycling79
into the now-familiar game theory construct by expressly recruiting
Mancur Olson’s discussion of the problem of collective action: 
Olson argued that groups frequently fail to work in their
collective interest to achieve group benefits because individual
self-interests get in the way.... The size of the group is often
related to the depth of the collective action problem; the greater
the numbers, the more difficult it is likely to be to solve the
problem, particularly given that “if one member does or does not
help provide the collective good, no other one member will be
significantly affected and therefore none has any reason to
react.” Recycling provides an excellent example. To achieve the
widespread benefits of recycling, a significant portion of the
population must participate. Yet each individual knows that her
individual behavior, standing alone, makes little difference; if I
throw my junk mail into the trash can rather than taking it out
to the recycling bin, I can easily rationalize such behavior by
questioning whether, in the scheme of things, my contribution
to the overuse of landfills is really worth the effort to recycle.80
Having described recycling as a large-number game, Carlson also
explains how it is also a “small-payoff” problem by referring to the
low, direct benefit received by any player.  She describes the bene-81
fits of recycling—including decreased landfill use, fewer emissions
from incinerators, and diminished use of virgin resources—as “gen-
eralized benefits to the collective not typically viewed as producing
76. Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1231, 1234 (2001).
77. See id. at 1232.
78. See id. at 1233-34.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 1243 (footnotes omitted).
81. Id. at 1249.
19
19
Geisinger: Reconceiving the Internal and Social Enforcement Effects of Expre
Published by William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository, 2018
20 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 58:1
any substantial, immediate benefit at an individual level.”82
Although Carlson does specifically recognize that energy conserva-
tion, like recycling, is a large-number, small-payoff game, she
asserts that conservation may be more susceptible to financial
incentives because wasteful energy consumption costs money.83
Because of the small-payoff structure of the problem, Carlson
concludes that expressive regulation plays, at best, a minor role in
increasing recycling. For example, she notes that programs designed
to lower the costs of recycling by allowing recyclables to be mixed in
one bin rather than separated into many bins are much more ef-
fective at increasing recycling rates than programs that use social
influence.  The limitations on normative regulation in large groups,84
Carlson suggests, arise from “[t]he same characteristics that make
a large-number, small-payoff problem difficult to resolve[:] ... large
numbers of people, little economic incentive to act, and lack of
homogeneity.”  85
This observation is starkly supported by Richard McAdam’s ob-
servation that enforcement of social norms in large groups creates
its own second-order cooperation problem:
[I]f sanctioning is costly, as most analyses assume, the puzzle is
to explain why individuals will ever begin to sanction violators
or why threats of sanctions are ever credible.... Even when the
norm benefits the group, a second-order collective action problem
remains: if others enforce the norm, the individual can gain the
norm's benefits without bearing enforcement costs; if others do
not enforce the norm, the individual's solo enforcement efforts
are wasted. The individual gains only in the rare case where her
82. Id. at 1242. Throughout the article, Carlson does note that there are some direct
monetary benefits of recycling, such as receiving a deposit back in states that have bottle bills.
See id. at 1266-67. Ultimately, she argues that such small payments affect behavior much less
than other factors, such as making recycling more convenient. Id. at 1296.
83. See id. at 1297. She further theorizes that small differences may ultimately have sig-
nificant effects on the power of normative remedies. Id. at 1298.
84. See id. at 1278-79.
85. Id. at 1235; see also Stephanie Stern, Encouraging Conservation on Private Lands: A
Behavioral Analysis of Financial Incentives, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 541, 556 (2006) (noting that
homes and similarly exclusive private spaces limit both the social reinforcement of pro-
environmental behavior and derision and shaming responses to anti-environmental actions). 
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contribution to enforcement by itself will “make or break” the
norm. Otherwise, the individual is better off not bearing enforce-
ment costs.86
In agreement with McAdams, Carlson concludes that normative
programs on their own are not powerful enough to shape behavior
meaningfully. She notes that “as Mancur Olson, Elinor Ostrom, and
others have theorized, large-number, small-payoff problems are
unlikely to be resolved without external intervention ... even if gov-
ernments can shape and strengthen social norms in favor of
resolution of the problem absent additional regulatory mechan-
isms.”87
Although recognizing the problems of cooperation in large groups,
Carlson draws some conclusions on how normative interventions
may be structured to be effective. Carlson suggests that the most
effective normative regimes will use “strategies that intensify
human contact and communication among potential cooperators ...
[to] achieve the sustained behavioral change necessary to resolve
collective action problems.”  Such an observation, of course, reflects88
the general rational, choice-based vision of groups and norms. In
essence, Carlson suggests strategies that turn larger groups into
smaller ones. Thus, under the rational-choice view, the existence of
large groups, such as those engaged in energy conservation, and the
need to cooperate create not just problems for the spontaneous crea-
tion of norms, but for direct normative regulation as well.
86. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 338, 352-53 (1997) (footnotes omitted); see also Taisu Zhang, Social Hierarchies and
the Formation of Customary Property Law in Pre-Industrial China and England, 62 AM. J.
COMP. L. 171, 177 n.24 (2014). Zhang writes:
Rational choice theories struggle, in particular, to explain how rational indi-
viduals desist from free-riding on norm enforcement and adherence. Although
certain evolutionary game theory models claim to explain social cooperation
under fixed conditions ... those conditions often seem unrealistic: for example,
that players interact one-on-one even in an n-person game and possess perfect
information. Some have attempted to bypass these difficulties by suggesting that
withholding or conferring esteem is “costless.”
Id. (citations omitted).
87. Carlson, supra note 76, at 1299.
88. Id. at 1251.
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B. The Internal Enforcement Mechanism
One can understand why individuals such as Carlson, Ellickson,
and Ostrom are skeptical of large-group norms as a means of pro-
moting cooperation. Norm surveillance and enforcement in such
situations is difficult. Moreover, the larger the group, the more dif-
fuse the interests and the less the reliance of group members on one
another for mutual benefit. In short, whereas members of small
groups interact regularly and have relatively homogenous prefer-
ences regarding the specific goals of their cooperation, members of
large groups rarely interact, have heterogeneous preferences, and
do not rely on each other for cooperative benefits.
As a result of this general skepticism, scholars turn to the intern-
al enforcement mechanism when considering norm activation in
large, loose-knit groups.  The mechanism of internalization, how-89
ever, is not nearly as well-studied by legal scholars as the social
sanctioning mechanism.  Whereas the traditional game-theory90
model predicts that social enforcement of norms will not be a suc-
cessful strategy in large-group games, it says little about internal
enforcement.  Game theorists have recognized the influence91
internalization of norms has on behavior, but have chosen in great
part to ignore that mechanism because of its complexity and
uncertain theoretical foundation.  92
As Michael Vandenbergh—perhaps the leading authority on in-
ternal enforcement—observes:
The norms literature provides only limited insights for the
resolution of negative-payoff, loose-knit group situations. Recent
studies of two types of efforts that rely on norms to influence
environmental behaviors, recycling norm campaigns and label-
ing programs, demonstrate the difficulty of changing behavior in
these situations. In addition, the more general legal literature
on norms is extensive, but the bulk of the scholarship has
89. See, e.g., Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms, supra note 26, at 1113-16.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 1114 n.54, 1115 n.60.
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focused on the role of externally-enforced social norms, which
have limited influence in loose-knit group situations.... Several
scholars have emphasized the importance of personal norms and
have argued that personal norms do influence behavior in some
types of loose-knit group situations. Yet the identification of the
most influential norms for particular behaviors, the means by
which personal norms become influential, and the ways in which
legal interventions can affect this process have received only
limited attention.93
Although there has been little work on norm internalization gen-
erally in the legal literature, one theory of internalization advanced
by Vandenbergh has found its way to the forefront of legal scholar-
ship. He adapts from the social sciences a model of internalization
defined as Values-Beliefs-Norms (VBN) theory to develop a model
of “personal norm activation.”  The VBN theory incorporates94
findings of empirical studies indicating that most individuals hold
at least four value clusters, each of which includes more specific
values.  “A new belief that a value is threatened and that the indi-95
vidual can act to reduce the threat tends to activate norms and
induce action.”  In his article on internal norm activation, Vanden-96
bergh explains the relationship between generalized abstract norms
and concrete norms of environmental protection.  He notes that97
information that the concrete behavior of conservation is good for
the environment activates the general norm of environmental
protection.  This induces behavior change by connecting the act of98
conservation to a broadly held belief of what is socially acceptable.99
Other theories of norm internalization do exist. For example, a
number of scholars have suggested that internalization is nothing
more than determining that a new behavior is actually preferred
93. Id. at 1112-13 (footnotes omitted).
94. Id. at 1101, 1116 n.68.
95. Id. at 1116 n.68.
96. Id. at 1115.
97. See id. at 1115-17.
98. See id.
99. Id.
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over another,  for example, determining that wearing a seatbelt is100
preferable to not wearing one.  Others have suggested that ex-101
ternal norms become internal ones through an iterative process in
which continuous adherence to the norm in the presence of others
leads an individual to begin to believe the norm is the “correct”
behavior and suffer guilt when failing to act in accordance with it.102
The social sciences literature does support personal norm acti-
vation. However, the literature suggests a different mechanism for
successful personal norm activation in large groups: simply pro-
viding information on the behavior of others can have a significant
impact on behavior.  In particular, social scientists have identified103
different ways in which information about others influences be-
havior other than through social normative effects or personal norm
activation.  “True” social learning may occur as a result of observ-104
ing the behavior of others.  This is considered “true” learning105
because it relates to changes in internal preferences and not just a
willingness to act publicly in accordance with the norm.  Pursuant106
to this literature, one need not consider complex personal norm
activation messages, such as those that VBN theory suggests.107
Rather, simply communicating to individuals what others are doing
can lead to significant behavioral change.  This is not to suggest108
that VBN theory has no place in the design of social norm cam-
paigns. Rather, VBN and social learning should be considered com-
plimentary mechanisms of norm activation and each tool should be
100. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 34, at 1611. 
101. See Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 62-
64 (2002).
102. See Geisinger & Stein, supra note 60, at 116-18; Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations
Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2646 (1997) (book review). 
103. See Robert B. Cialdini et al., Managing Social Norms for Persuasive Impact, 1 SOC.
INFLUENCE 3, 4-5 (2006); Noah J. Goldstein, Robert B. Cialdini & Vladas Griskevicius, A
Room with a Viewpoint: Using Social Norms to Motivate Environmental Conservation in
Hotels, 35 J. CONSUMER RES. 472, 472-74 (2008); Griskevicius et al., supra note 41, at 6;
Matthew E. Kahn, Do Greens Drive Hummers or Hybrids? Environmental Ideology as a
Determinant of Consumer Choice, 54 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 129, 130 (2007). 
104. See Goldstein et al., supra note 103, at 479-80.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
108. See Goldstein et al., supra note 103, at 479-80.
24
24
William & Mary Law Review Online, Vol. 58 [2018], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline/vol58/iss1/1
2016] EXPRESSIVE REGULATION 25
used when it will be most effective.
III. APPLYING THE SOCIAL AND INTERNAL ENFORCEMENT MODELS
TO REGULATION OF LARGE, LOOSE-KNIT GROUPS
Legal scholarship concludes that social sanctioning is effective in
the small, close-knit group environment and ineffective in large-
group games.  Pursuant to this view, internalized norm activation109
becomes the expressive tool of choice in the large-group context.110
This Article argues that, although internal activation is a cost-
effective means of regulating, the power of internalization to change
behavior in large groups may be limited. Instead of relying on the
weak internal force, the Article asserts that regulators should con-
sider ways to harness the strong social sanctioning force for such
groups. The Article uses a simple information registry to explain
how both the dilution and free-riding problems that plague norm
enforcement in large groups can be overcome. Such registries could
be used in any number of areas in which the cooperation problem
involves a large group.  Everything from tax compliance, hiring111
disabled workers, and decreasing Greenhouse Gas Emissions
(GHGs) could be effectively regulated through such a mechanism.112
Because the area of energy conservation has been the focus of the
majority of the literature on norm activation in large-group games,
this Article will focus on the same topic in explaining the basic reg-
istry model.  Energy conservation is a large-group game of great113
109. See supra Part II.
110. See supra Part II.
111. See also Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan A. Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, 40 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 217, 246 n.109 (2015) (describing how labeling and certification schemes may also
carry the information necessary to trigger social enforcement).
112. See generally id. at 258-60 (discussing the use of a private climate legacy registry as
a means of private governance to reduce carbon emissions).
113. See, e.g., Hunt Allcott, Consumers’ Perceptions and Misperceptions of Energy Costs,
101 AM. ECON. REV. 98, 99, 103 (2011); Hunt Allcott, Social Norms and Energy Conservation,
95 J. PUB. ECON. 1082, 1082-83 (2011) [hereinafter Allcott, Social Norms]; David Card &
Laura Giuliano, Peer Effects and Multiple Equilibria in the Risky Behavior of Friends, 95 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 1130, 1146 (2013); Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Normative
Conduct: Recycling the Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J. PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1015, 1015, 1025 (1990); Cialdini et al., supra note 103, at 11-12;
25
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importance. It has been estimated that individuals are responsible
for between 32 and 40 percent of all GHG emissions.  Given that114
any meaningful response to climate change will require substantial
cuts in GHGs, these numbers simply do not allow for the individual
to be ignored as a regulatory target. As Amy Sinden notes, “Even if
tomorrow, we get all the electric utilities to cut their greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions in half, if we as individuals keep leaving our com-
puters on all night and buying bigger and better plasma TV screens,
we’re not going to solve the problem.”  Put another way, “[i]f those115
emissions from individuals could be decreased by just one percent,
that would represent a reduction of 1 billion pounds of carbon
dioxide.”116
Timothy G. Conley & Christopher R. Udry, Learning About a New Technology: Pineapple in
Ghana, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 35, 62 (2010); Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, Energy
Conservation “Nudges” and Environmentalist Ideology: Evidence from a Randomized Reside-
ntial Electricity Field Experiment, 11 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 680, 681-82, 698 (2013); Esther
Duflo & Emmanuel Saez, The Role of Information and Social Interactions in Retirement Plan
Decisions: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment, 118 Q.J. ECONOMICS 815, 839 (2003);
Andrew D. Foster & Mark R. Rosenzweig, Learning by Doing and Learning from Others:
Human Capital and Technical Change in Agriculture, 103 J. POL. ECON. 1176, 1204-06 (1995);
Goldstein et al., supra note 103, at 480; Griskevicius et al., supra note 41, at 12; David
Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational Cascades,
in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 188 (Mariano Tommasi & Kathryn Ierulli eds.,
1995); Kahn, supra note 103; Kaivan Munshi, Social Learning in a Heterogeneous Population:
Technology Diffusion in the Indian Green Revolution, 73 J. DEV. ECON. 185, 186-87 (2004);
Jessica M. Nolan et al., Normative Social Influence Is Underdetected, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 913, 913-15 (2008); Matthew J. Salganik et al., Experimental Study of
Inequality and Unpredictability in an Artificial Cultural Market, 311 SCIENCE 854, 854 (2006);
P. Wesley Schultz et al., The Constructive, Destructive, and Reconstructive Power of Social
Norms, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 429, 429-30 (2007); Hunt Allcott & Todd Rogers, The Short-Run and
Long-Run Effects of Behavioral Interventions: Experimental Evidence from Energy Conser-
vation 2-5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18492, 2012); Markus M.
Mobius et al., Social Learning and Consumer Demand 1-28 (Dec. 17, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
114. See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, Carbon-Neutral, supra note 26, at 1694; see also Amy
Sinden, Revenue-Neutral Cap and Trade, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10944, 10945 (2009).
115. Sinden, supra note 114, at 10945.
116. Albert C. Lin, Evangelizing Climate Change, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1135, 1146 (2009)
(citing Vandenbergh & Steinemann, Carbon-Neutral, supra note 26, at 1695).
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A. The Limits of Internalized Regimes: The Opower Example
Given the well-entrenched understanding that the social enforce-
ment mechanism is not available in large-group games, virtually all
discussions of expressive regulation in such games focus on internal-
ization.  Perhaps the best-known example of expressive regulation117
in large-group games is Opower’s current work to decrease energy
consumption.  Opower works with utilities to increase energy118
conservation.  Opower does so primarily through the mechanism119
of social learning.  It sends mailers to individuals with information120
on the energy use of their neighbors.  Although the Opower121
mailers primarily focus on communicating to individuals what
others are doing, the mailers also contain other information, such
as cost-effective ways of decreasing energy use.  Empirical litera-122
ture, however, demonstrates that it is the social comparison mech-
anism that does the heavy lifting.  Individuals who receive this123
information and exceed the neighbor average have reason to think
about lowering their energy consumption. Similar campaigns have
117. See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the
Environment: Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 118,
143-44 (2009); Ela, supra note 61, at 95-97; Andrew Green, You Can't Pay Them Enough:
Subsidies, Environmental Law, and Social Norms, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 409-11
(2006); Katrina Fischer Kuh, Capturing Individual Harms, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 155, 193-
95 (2011) [hereinafter Kuh, Individual Harms]; Katrina Fischer Kuh, Personal Environmental
Information: The Promise and Perils of the Emerging Capacity to Identify Individual
Environmental Harms, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1565, 1567-69 (2012) [hereinafter Kuh, Promise and
Perils]; Douglas A. Kysar & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Introduction: Climate Change and
Consumption, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10825, 10832 (2008); Sinden, supra note 114, at 10944-45;
Sunstein, supra note 6, at 415-17; Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms, supra note 26,
at 1101-02; Vandenbergh & Steinemann, Carbon-Neutral, supra note 26, at 38-39.
118. Energy Efficiency, OPOWER, https://opower.com/products/energy-efficiency/ [https://
perma.cc/7MCL-KJ2W].
119. See Lacey, supra note 43.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See Steven Lacey, Is Opower About to Reinvent Residential Demand Response?,
GREENTECH MEDIA (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/opower-
launches-behavioral-demand-response-program [https://perma.cc/UZB8-9PJP].
123. Cialdini et al., supra note 103, at 4 (noting the powerful effect of the social force on
behavior); Goldstein et al., supra note 103, at 480.
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been used in other areas, such as decreasing tax evasion.124
However, a number of potential limitations lessen the effective-
ness of internal enforcement campaigns like Opower’s. This sug-
gests such campaigns, alone, may not be enough to achieve the
levels of behavioral change necessary to achieve regulatory goals.
Both VBN and social learning require relatively strong generalized
norms to be successful. Consider the way VBN works. VBN acti-
vates personal norms by connecting a specific behavior to a broader
meta-norm or preference.  If such meta-norm (say caring for the125
environment) is weakly held, connecting a specific behavior—energy
conservation, for example—to that norm is not likely to have much
behavioral impact.  Similarly, social learning will be influential126
only if the information on how others behave relates to something
the recipient values significantly.  It is thus more likely for inter-127
nalization campaigns to have substantial impacts when the specific
behavior can be connected to a compelling preference.
In addition, focusing on only one preference at a time is unrealis-
tic and fails to consider competition from other meta-norms. When
competition with other meta-norms is considered, personal norm
activation as a means of behavior change becomes less compelling.
For example, as Professor Vandenbergh notes, norm change in
loose-knit groups is not likely to occur if norms of convenience have
also been activated.  Others too have consistently noted that norm-128
ative effects in loose-knit groups are less likely to work when the
behavior change requires individual effort.  All this points to the129
fact that unless the particular meta-norm being activated is a
124. See John Cullis et al., Social Norms and Tax Compliance: Framing the Decision to Pay
Tax, 41 J. SOCIO-ECON. 159, 159 (2012).
125. See supra Section II.B. For a discussion of the distinction between norms and meta-
norms, see Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2237, 2252 n.46 (1996).
126. See Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms, supra note 26, at 1117-24.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 1132-33.
129. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 76, at 1233-34; see also Stephanie M. Stern, Smart-Grid:
Technology and the Psychology of Environmental Behavior Change, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 139,
151 (2011) (“It may be the case that people feel particularly at liberty to satisfy their indi-
vidual desires and convenience, rather than their environmental responsibilities, within the
four walls of the home.”).
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powerful one, personal norm change alone cannot substantially alter
behavior.
These observations are supported by empirical evidence. Consider
the impacts of Opower’s program on conservation. Although Opower
mailers have had an effect on conservation, the effect has been lim-
ited. Studies show that the mailers have decreased energy use by
about 2 percent.  This is a valuable decrease given the low cost of130
Opower mailers,  and such positive behavioral effects suggest131
internal norm activation campaigns play an important role in any
regulatory regime. But internal activation alone will not be enough
to achieve the decrease in GHG emissions from residential energy
use necessary to respond to climate change.132
Moreover, internalized norm campaigns that provide information
on the behavior of others, such as Opower’s, may actually retard ef-
forts to achieve a regulatory goal. This problem has two dimensions.
First, normative influence can create incentives for individuals who
are doing better than their neighbors to do less. For example, those
who conserve energy at lower levels than the group average may
actually increase their energy use in response to receiving informa-
tion on the group norm.  Empirical research based on Opower’s133
own data has suggested this to be the case, and Opower has success-
fully responded to the problem by adding a prescriptive command
to the information already provided.  Second, and more impor-134
tantly, normative influence serves to anchor behavior to the
community norm. The same pressure that leads individuals who
over-conserve to return to the norm will also keep people from want-
ing to either go above the norm or below it once they have conserved
in accordance with the community norm. This group anchoring
130. Allcott, Social Norms, supra note 113, at 1083, 1093.
131. It is estimated that the price of energy would have to go up approximately 11 to 20
percent to have the same effect. See id. Thus, Opower mailers are certainly a cost-effective
means for increasing conservation. See Allcott & Rogers, supra note 113, at 2.
132. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms, supra note 26, at 1118-19 (dis-
cussing abstract norms, such as the reciprocity norm).
134. See Allcott, Social Norms, supra note 113, at 1083. The potential power of prescriptive
norms to cancel out decreases in conservation has not been considered in the context of in-
creasing conservation from those who conserve the least.
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effect suggests that internalized norm campaigns are only as good
as other components of a regulatory regime. If the regulation does
not create other incentives to change behavior and thus change the
group average, information on the norm will likely entrench be-
havior so that it resists change. Thus, although clearly a cost-effec-
tive mechanism that should be considered in any comprehensive
regulatory regime, the power of internal enforcement on its own to
accomplish behavioral change is likely limited.
In sum, internal norm activation campaigns, such as Opower’s,
are cost-effective means for incentivizing individuals to decrease
energy use. However, in situations in which the meta-norm is not
highly valued and a variety of meta-norms influence behavioral de-
cisions, internalized norm enforcement campaigns can only slightly
change behavior. Moreover, in some cases, such campaigns may
stagnate progress.
B. External Enforcement of Norms in Large Groups: The Carbon
Registry Example
As the theory of social norm enforcement suggests, impediments
to the use of powerful social normative forces in large-group games
exist. The theory shows that the large and loose-knit aspects of
groups make norm surveillance more difficult. Further, the power
of social sanctioning is diluted when one is not bound to the group
for cooperative benefit in other endeavors. This Section suggests
that making information regarding an individual’s behavior avail-
able to other members of her close-knit group can overcome both of
these problems. An information registry could provide information
on any number of behaviors for which a norm exists in society, from
who pays their taxes to how many minorities are in a particular
business’s workforce.
In the case of energy conservation, the idea of a GHG registry is
not entirely new. Professors Vandenbergh and Steinemann first
outlined the potential for such a regulatory mechanism in their
article on the carbon-neutral individual.  In that article, they make135
135. See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, Carbon-Neutral, supra note 26. 
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a case for the use of an “Individual Carbon-Release Inventory,”136
grounded primarily in the theory of norm internalization—particu-
larly Vandenbergh’s VBN theory.  The authors first consider the137
way in which information on individual carbon emissions could be
used to inform individuals through news and other media of the
importance of carbon-neutrality.  As they note, disclosure of infor-138
mation “could activate the carbon-neutrality norm by changing
beliefs about the harms caused by individual carbon emissions.”139
This, of course, resonates directly with norm internalization theory,
which suggests changes in beliefs will result in changes to how a
person values a particular result. If the change in value is signifi-
cant enough, individuals will reorient their priorities from not con-
serving energy to conserving energy.140
The authors then provide additional support for the use of an
Individual Carbon-Release Inventory by turning to another aspect
of VBN theory—the connection of specific behaviors to larger meta-
norms. They start by reiterating their assertion that “the personal
responsibility norm may be more widely held than the environmen-
tal protection norm,” and that “[i]ndividuals are more likely to be
motivated by information that indicates that their behavior will
cause economic or physical harm to other people than by informa-
tion about harms caused to the environment.”  As a result, the141
authors conclude that providing information on “potential human
health and economic harms of climate change may activate carbon-
136. Id. at 1729. For a discussion of the relationship between the Individual Carbon-
Release Inventory and the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), see id. at 1729-31. The TRI has
been enormously successful. See Madhu Khanna et al., Toxics Release Information: A Policy
Tool for Environmental Protection, 36 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 243, 245 (1998). Indeed, the
TRI has been described by the EPA as “one of the most powerful tools in this country for
environmental protection,” OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION & TOXICS, U.S. EPA, EPA 745-
F-95-001, EXPANDING COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW: RECENT CHANGES IN THE TOXICS RELEASE
INVENTORY 3 (1995), and “one of the most successful policy instruments ever created for im-
proving environmental performance,” OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION AND TOXICS, U.S.
EPA, ISSUE PAPER ON EXPANSION OF TOXIC RELEASE INVENTORY, TRI PHASE 3 (1995).
137. See Vandenbergh & Steinemann, Carbon-Neutral, supra note 26, at 1707-08.
138. See id. at 1730-31.
139. Id. at 1731.
140. See, e.g., supra Section II.B.
141. Vandenbergh & Steinemann, Carbon-Neutral, supra note 26, at 1732.
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neutrality norms among those who feel strongly about personal
responsibility but do not ascribe to the environmental protection
norm.”142
Similar arguments can be found in the wealth of articles that
have taken up the charge of regulating individual GHG emissions.
Hope Babcock, for example, argues further for the importance of the
personal responsibility meta-norm.  Separately, Katrina Fischer143
Kuh argues that norm activation is best achieved by delegating
normative regulation to the local level.  The argument for local144
regulation can be understood through the lens of the internal/social
dichotomy. According to Kuh, delegation to the smallest level of
government will ensure that the proper motivational meta-norms of
any small community can be triggered.  In other words, in the145
communities that value environmental protection, local normative
campaigns can resonate with those values. In other communities
that value personal responsibility, different normative campaigns
can be formed that appeal to that particular meta-norm.  It bears146
noting that a scheme that delegates to local regulators also reflects
the general understanding that social enforcement is more likely to
work within smaller, more close-knit groups.147
As this Article has already discussed, this reliance on internal
enforcement is not likely to cause significant behavior change in
most large-group games.  Although the existence of a registry may148
influence internal beliefs about the importance of decreasing GHG
emissions, this Article suggests that individuals should not overlook
how such registries could also trigger social enforcement. A carbon
registry, like any registry, has the ability to overcome the key
limitations to social enforcement in large-group games. Specifically,
registries can overcome both the dilution and surveillance limita-
tions on social enforcement.
142. Id. at 1732-33.
143. See Babcock, supra note 117, at 118.
144. See Kuh, Individual Harms, supra note 117, at 166-70.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 185-86.
147. See Carlson, supra note 76, at 1245-47.
148. See supra Section III.A.
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To begin, consider the effects of a carbon registry on dilution. At
the heart of the theoretical limitations of normative intervention
into large group problems is the conception of the game itself. That
conception starts and ends with the notion that the group to be
analyzed is defined by the cooperative endeavor. Conservation is
generally conceived of as a large group problem because a large
number of individuals all need to conserve in order to meet carbon
emissions targets.  Of course, there are significant impediments to149
the use of norms as a means of ensuring cooperation in these large
groups.  But scholars who are skeptical of the use of social sanc-150
tioning in large groups miss the fact that individuals in large groups
are also members of a number of small, close-knit communities, and
by making information available to other community members, the
possibility of social sanctions increases.
Norms simply reflect aggregate group preferences.  One impli-151
cation of this understanding is that normative forces can extend be-
yond the boundaries of any particular cooperation problem. In other
words, if the members of a small, close-knit group have a known
preference for conservation, the traditional forms of attraction
among members of such a group will lead a group member to care
about the publication of her energy use. Most people are members
of small, close-knit groups upon which they rely for their own well-
being. Consider, for example, the group of friends one has while a
student, or work and social friends later in life. One is reliant on
these friends for study or work help, entertainment, general counsel
or support, and many other things. The fact that the group satisfies
these basic needs reinforces an individual’s liking of group mem-
bers. If an individual group member thinks that others in the group
prefer energy conservation, release of information through a carbon
registry would pressure that person to meet the group’s normative
mandate. In this sense, the use of a registry may well take advan-
tage of the social pressures exerted by small groups, thus skirting
149. See Carlson, supra note 76, at 1244; see also supra Section II.A (discussing the prob-
lems of large-group cooperation).
150. See supra Section II.A.
151. See supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
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the dilution problem of large-group games.152
Registries, if properly designed, can also overcome many of the
surveillance problems created by large-group games. The types of
activities considered by a registry will depend on such factors as the
availability of public information on the activity, the cost of obtain-
ing information, and how the data is reported.  By packaging the153
gathered information in a simple and understandable format,  a154
registry will make it easy to find out about the particular behavior,
including, for example, per-capita minority employees or energy
used.
Of course, the more private the information, the less likely a reg-
istry could be used. In particular, some concerns about personal
privacy could hamper registries that report information on individ-
uals rather than businesses.  Concerns over privacy, however, may155
not be as substantial as initially perceived. First, with the rise of
social media, society has begun to narrow the scope of what is per-
ceived to be private information.  Moreover, as social media156
demonstrates, social pressure may influence individuals to volun-
tarily share information.  Vandenbergh and Stienemann further157
note, “Although many past informational efforts have been ineffec-
tive, in prior times of crisis—such as the scrap drives of World War
II—government has engaged in successful efforts to persuade indi-
viduals to act by providing information about the effects of behav-
ior.”  Climate change, for example, could be a compelling cause for158
efforts to gather information on GHG production.
152. See, e.g., Vandenbergh & Gilligan, supra note 111, at 253-54 (noting that a small num-
ber of individuals from nongovernmental entities and multinational corporations interact,
creating opportunities for social sanctioning).
153. For a general set of factors to be considered in design, see Vandenbergh & Steine-
mann, Carbon-Neutral, supra note 26, at 1734-39.
154. See id. at 1731.
155. Given the success of the TRI and the availability of data on industrial production of
carbon, there is little reason to doubt the effectiveness of a mandatory carbon registry for the
industry.
156. Cf. AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., TEENS, TECHNOLOGY & FRIENDSHIPS
54-55 (2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/08/Teens-and-Friendships-FINAL2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5PWJ-7V82] (discussing this phenomenon as it relates to teenagers).
157. See id. at 58-61.
158. Vandenbergh & Steinemann, Carbon-Neutral, supra note 26, at 1728.
34
34
William & Mary Law Review Online, Vol. 58 [2018], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlronline/vol58/iss1/1
2016] EXPRESSIVE REGULATION 35
Katrina Fischer Kuh has recently considered the privacy issue (or
the “intrusion objection”) as it relates to behavioral mandates in
environmental law.  She notes that “[t]he intrusion objection hy-159
pothesizes fatal resistance to mandates imposed in the context of
environmentally significant individual behaviors,” and then
suggests that such a monolithic objection cannot stand.  Such a160
hypothesis does not comport with the reality that individuals regu-
larly accept direct intrusions in order to protect the environment.161
Kuh does recognize, however, that direct information collection may
be more objectionable than indirect collection.  Whether a registry162
that gathers personal information that is usually deemed to be
private would survive informational privacy objections remains to
be seen.
Of course, business entities are not subject to the same privacy
concerns as individuals. We regularly require businesses to provide
information to society, whether it is the calories in their food or the
harmfulness of their products.  The primary purpose of such re-163
quirements is to provide information relevant to individual decision-
making, which may influence business behavior by directly
impacting revenue.  A person with information on the calorie count164
159. See Katrina Fischer Kuh, When Government Intrudes: Regulating Individual Be-
haviors That Harm the Environment, 61 DUKE L.J. 1111, 1148 (2012); see also Kuh, Promise
and Perils, supra note 117, at 1549.
160. Kuh, supra note 159, at 1160-61.
161. See id. at 1148 (“[D]irect regulation of at least some environmentally significant indi-
vidual behaviors is relatively common and is generally accepted, primarily at the local level.
This acceptance is present even when enforcement, or at least the threat of enforcement, is
arguably quite intrusive.”); see generally id. at 1132-47.
162. See id. at 1163.
163. See, e.g., Menu and Vending Machines Labeling Requirements, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/LabelingNutrition/ucm217
762.=htm [https://perma.cc/48WS-5YPY] (last updated Mar. 9, 2016) (food labeling); Statutes,
U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Regulations-Laws--Standards/
Statutes/ [https://perma.cc/B873-WV5F] (product safety labeling).
164. Michael Vandenbergh has argued, for example, that labeling and certification systems
can overcome collective action problems that arise due to the global nature of certain prob-
lems, such as tropical deforestation and climate change. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private
Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 165-70 (2013). Such systems allow indi-
viduals to act in accordance with their preferences for environmental protection in the market
to achieve an allocation of resources that better reflects such preferences. See id. 
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of a burger can make a better informed choice about whether to eat
it. Similarly, a person who understands the latent dangers in a pro-
duct may choose not to buy it.
Norm registries provide different information. They inform the
public about whether a business is acting in accordance with the
majority’s preferences regarding behaviors such as hiring employ-
ees, paying taxes, and conserving energy. In these cases, social
pressure may be an additional force of behavioral change in addition
to revenue impacts. One can easily imagine that individuals who
work for a company whose behavior conflicts with community norms
may be shamed by such an association. The social force, of course,
becomes more pronounced as economic consequences become more
attenuated. In the case of individual behavior, when direct economic
consequences are generally not at issue, social pressure from reg-
istries is likely to be the primary mechanism of behavior change.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LARGE-GROUP SOCIAL ENFORCEMENT
MODEL
The fact that a national information provision may resonate in
small, close-knit groups is a sword that cuts two ways. Although a
national carbon registry is likely to decrease individual GHG emis-
sions, the registry model identifies a number of concerns that must
be addressed in registry design. The goal for registry architects
would be to maximize benefits while limiting costs.
The power of social enforcement depends on what an individual
group member believes others in the group prefer, how many people
indicate the preference, and the degree to which they value the
particular behavior.  For example, if most of the group has a165
strong preference for drinking tequila shots while out at a bar,
another group member will feel significant normative pressure to
conform. On the other hand, if only a small number of group
members are drinking tequila shots and the majority of the group
seems indifferent to the behavior, a group member will feel less
pressure to conform. Thus, different groups will likely enforce a
165. Cf. Geisinger, supra note 101, at 64-65.
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conservation norm to different extents based on the depth of prefer-
ences held by group members.
These different groups are important to our understanding of the
effects of social sanctioning through the use of a registry because
individuals in some of these groups may compete inefficiently for
esteem in certain circumstances. Competitions for esteem can result
in inefficient personal allocations of resources in some circumstanc-
es.  Consider, for example, the members of a group that highly166
esteems conservation. With publication of an individual’s carbon
footprint, each individual group member is likely to increase his or
her conservation. For example, he may lower his thermostat more
in winter and install LED light bulbs. But as each individual group
member invests in decreasing his carbon footprint, this raises the
cost of getting esteem from other group members because the group
average has been raised.  An individual who desires group esteem167
will thus have to spend even more on conservation in order to
differentiate his behavior from that of others.  Thus, competition168
for esteem may lead some group members to buy a hybrid car or in-
vest in solar panels. Of course, as group members continue to
compete for the esteem of others, the bar defining what amount of
conservation is normal for the group will rise, and meeting or ex-
ceeding the bar again becomes costlier.169
The same phenomenon will occur for groups that prioritize con-
sumptive behaviors rather than conservation. Although the prefer-
ence for environmental protection is thought to be widespread,170
166. See supra Section II.A.
167. See supra Section II.A.
168. McAdams, supra note 86, at 352.
169. Although the race leads to excessive individual investment in conservation among
group members, it does not go on forever. As Richard McAdams notes, at some point a new
equilibrium will be reached:
“The feedback effect is that one person's new norm compliance raises the aver-
age and lowers everyone else's relative position. One individual's contribution
thus provides an incentive for others to contribute. Obviously, the contributions
do not rise infinitely, but they stop only when no one can gain by additional
contributions, when the opportunity costs of one's time or money exceed any
esteem return.”
Id. at 369.
170. Although of relatively low order, a majority of individuals do indicate that they have
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groups of individuals with anti-environmental preferences likely
exist. In the current political landscape, many groups spurn envi-
ronmental protection as involving too much governmental interven-
tion and limiting individual choice and freedom.  Additional171
groups may be composed of individuals who deny the existence of
climate change or at least that humans can affect temperature
change on the planet.  It may well be that libertarian beliefs and172
climate change denial co-exist in many groups.173
Individuals in these groups are likely to esteem behavior that
reflects the group’s high-order preference for freedom from govern-
ment interference and its belief that responding to climate change
is unwarranted. Members of these groups are thus likely to receive
esteem for behavior that increases GHG emissions—for example,
buying a car or truck with low gas mileage—rather than behavior
that decreases GHG emissions. There is, of course, a constraint on
competition for esteem within libertarian groups. Energy consump-
tion costs money, and thus failure to buy a fuel efficient vehicle or
to insulate one’s house will incur additional energy costs. These
additional costs will curtail these groups members’ willingness to
race for esteem.
a preference for environmental protection. See, e.g., ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ ET AL., YALE
PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N & GEORGE MASON UNIV. CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
COMMC’N, PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY POLICIES IN APRIL 2013, at 6 (2013),
http://environment.yale.edu/climate-communication/files/Climate-Policy-Report-April-2013-
Revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4V7-328Z].
171. See, e.g., About Us, TEA PARTY, http://www.teaparty-platform.com/about-us [https://
perma.cc/7HMU-VLH6] (protecting free markets from government interference); see also
About Cato, CATO INST., http://www.cato.org/about [https:perma.cc/B9R3-LPTX] (identifying
the Cato Institute as “dedicated to the principles of individual liberty, limited government,
free markets and peace,” and noting that the Institute is primarily supported by individual
donors).
172. See generally Riley E. Dunlap & Aaron M. McCright, Climate Change Denial: Sources,
Actors and Strategies, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIETY 240
(Constance Lever-Tracy ed., 2010).
173. See Noah M. Sachs, Can We Regulate Our Way to Energy Efficiency? Product Stand-
ards as Climate Policy, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1631, 1675 (2012) (“Given widespread denial of cli-
mate change on the right, it will be difficult for any Republican politician to justify efficiency
standards on environmental grounds. Even if standards are justified purely as cost-saving
measures, rather than as climate change strategy, the cost-saving arguments may be trumped
in the future by concerns over intrusive government.”).
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The potential small increase in GHG emissions from deniers and
libertarians will likely offset some of the decrease in emissions from
those who highly esteem conservation. The net result of such groups
responding to normative nudges will thus be an overspending of
resources relevant to the decrease in GHG emissions achieved. Con-
sider an individual who, without competition for esteem, would
invest a small amount in decreasing energy use, according to her
preferences. Assuming that individuals rationally choose the most
cost-effective strategies first, perhaps she would change to LED
lightbulbs and install a smart thermostat. Perception of a strong
pro-conservation norm within her group, however, may lead the
individual to invest significantly more in conservation, perhaps by
installing new attic insulation and a more efficient furnace and air
conditioner. Put simply, the individual would overspend relative to
her preferences for conservation.174
It might be said that overspending relative to preferences is the
precise goal of a carbon registry. That is, carbon registries create
powerful social incentives for individuals to spend money on energy
conservation regardless of their preferences for conservation absent
normative influence. Although this may be the ultimate goal of a
registry, registry design must consider the inefficient investments
of groups on both ends of the conservation spectrum. A simple way
to respond to this concern would be to cap reported emissions at the
extremes. If one has already met the maximum decrease in GHG
emissions counted by a registry, for example, extra efforts at conser-
vation will have no effect on esteem because it will not change the
way in which her emissions are reported.
In sum, a carbon registry for industry or for individuals is likely
to create significant decreases in the amount of carbon produced by
both groups as a result of social enforcement. Yet, concerns regard-
ing privacy, efficiency, and the distribution of compliance costs exist
and must be considered in registry design.
174. It might be argued that the decrease in utility from overspending on conservation is
offset by the increase in utility that occurs from getting esteem. Such an argument misses the
fact that the level of esteem does not necessarily rise while parties are racing for esteem.
Rather, parties could continue to receive the same amount of esteem for a lesser investment
that reflects their preferences absent esteem competitions. 
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CONCLUSION
The demand for smarter regulation with low enforcement costs
has led governments to turn to new forms of behavioral regulation.
One of these tools is expressive regulation. Expressive regulation
holds significant promise for influencing many different types of
behaviors, including energy conservation. However, traditional
views of norms suggest that the force of social enforcement is lost in
large group games. This Article suggests something different.
Powerful social influences can be harnessed even when the need to
cooperate is spread over a large, loose-knit group. Specifically, the
social force can be harnessed in large-group games by regulatory
structures that overcome transaction costs and the dilution of inter-
dependence that exist within large groups. A carbon registry is an
example of just such a response. Carbon registries can overcome
both the problem of dilution and transaction costs while providing
strong behavioral prompts to aid in conservation. 
Of course, registries are not a panacea. Many issues, including
concerns over privacy, the cost of gathering data, and how to deal
with the distribution of compliance costs must be considered in
registry design. Many regulatory targets such as climate change re-
quire the use of a variety of different regulatory tools. Given the
potential low cost of both creation and enforcement, as well as the
potential for social enforcement to significantly change behavior,
expressive regulation should not be overlooked as one such tool.
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